

III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

When deciding to download a piece, the peer should first check with its neighboring peers on the piece's availability. If none of the neighbors have the piece, it should sort the other peers in its list by their upload speeds. If however the piece is available with neighbors, then the sorting should be done based first on the PR of uploaded pieces in the previous round. In either case, the formula (3) used for unchoking in [1] should be used.

D. Connection Class

The connection class is perhaps the most different when emulating than for the simulator. In either case however, a point to point connection must be established between the two peer clients. In the simulator this can be realized by a simple reading from and writing to socket code. It is required to generate a TCP connection handler that will manage sending and receiving of the pieces. There should also be a data buffer taking care of write/read lengths which can be detached as applicable. The connection handler can be easily implemented by treating one node as the server and another as the client. Hence, all we need is a parent (belonging to class TCP Server), a socket connection and a listener. Following this, modules should be written to handle the received messages, reading data from the connection and handling the message queue. The message queue can be written by using a Runnable writer [3] and a separate *sendmessage* function.

E. Client Class

The *client* is the prTorrent peer that we focus on. We perform the client's unchoking using prTorrent and test its performance among a swarm of BitTorrent peers. This is different from [1] where we simulated all peers following prTorrent. This design feature enables our protocol to be easily emulated in a true network scenario. This will also facilitate testing the effects of an exploitation environment or starvation on prTorrent peers. The upload bandwidth of the client is taken as an input parameter before the simulation begins.

F. Main Class

The main class simulates the swarm domain of influence. As such it needs to decide the piece size and then divide the input file size into necessary number of pieces. The main class also performs the task of the tracker for the simulator purposes. However, for the emulator, we would need a separate class to interact with the tracker of the network. The main class should contain a vector of peers present in the swarm and the pieces that each of them hold. However, this is where our design differs from most other simulators. We actually run two layered simulations- one for all the peers except the prTorrent *client* performing unchoking among themselves using various other BitTorrent clients and one for the interaction of the prTorrent *client* with these other peers. Therefore, for emulation, we just need to remove the first simulation layer and our protocol will be ready to connect to other peers on the Internet.

We are testing the simulator in situations similar to our original tests for prTorrent. In terms of the Discount Parameter (DP) Exploitation referred in [1], we found that we can mathematically predict the minimum numbers of peers required to remain fair in order to maintain a DP exploitation scenario within the swarm. The minimal value can be reached by realizing that uploading in p2p is a collective action. This means that aims of the whole swarm together are best served if every peer uploads, but it is not in the best private interest of the individual peers. Hence, if the collective payoff for each peer from uploading is $p(n)$ and the payoff of a DP exploiter is $s(n)$, then the minimal 'n' peers required to avoid DP exploitation is obtained when:

$$p(n+1) = s(n)$$

The Nash Equilibrium for fairness will be maintained as long as $p(n+1)$ is greater than $s(n)$. The mathematical formulation of this collective payoff in p2p is still an open challenge.

Let us consider the DP (δ) = $1 / (1 + r)$, where r is rate of decrease of the piece value with each successive transfer. However, with DP exploitation, there is a probability 'p' attached to whether further interaction will occur or whether the exploiter will defect. Hence, $p \delta = 1 / (1 + R)$, where R is the effective rate of return on a future payoff. This value of 'p' is judged by the PR of the requested piece. It clearly shows that if 'p' is less, cooperative behavior maintained by BitTorrent Tit-for-Tat will disintegrate since:

$$R = \frac{1 - p \delta}{p \delta}$$

IV. CONCLUSION

The prTorrent p2p simulator was built with the perspective of easing the transfer from simulators to emulators. We hope this will provide guidance to new developers on the structured development of a p2p network. It also contains theoretical insights that prTorrent can estimate a Nash Equilibrium that mitigates exploitation and promotes optimized performances.

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